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    There is a large bulk of medieval Arabic literature about the different and various teachings of the so-called Socrates or “imaginative Socrates” – someone who is in objective / historical and subjective / fanciful interworld . Among these, (in this paper) I want to explore and examine the main quality and characteristic of their “receptions” Socrates’ political teachings. Their receptions of Socrates’ personality manifest themselves in two “biographical” and “ideological” forms that I examine the latter one here. Accordingly, the ideological aspect of the medieval Arabic literature about the so-called Socrates’ political teachings will be explored by the texts through the texts.  
   Yet the medieval Arabic texts are in the manner of “gnomic aphoristic literature” and the body of the discourse being in fact a string of detached maxims in which the author’s personal commands and admonitions are mingled with maxims drawn from different and diverse sources. Therefore, there is a loose unity among these precepts and we should keep this state in our mind in examining medieval Arabic literature about the so-called political teachings of Socrates. 
       Besides, consideration of these relevant political teachings need a preliminary introduction, which with regard to the rationale of the medieval Arabic milieu, we have to construct through these texts.        
       
1-Virtual Reconstruction     
     With regard to the mentioned state of our related sources, it seems that we need to examine and analyze the “gnomic literature” of the medieval Arabic related to the so-called Socrates in order to provide and construct a unity for it related to your research topic. Thereby, we should categorize the extant available literature in order to make our research possible. With regard to the quality of the medieval Arabic gnomic aphoristic literature, it is more appropriate to classify them and search our topic under the title of “practical ethics”, or more precisely “precepts” that in one of its branches related to the relations of human beings, including society in general; and men and women, parents, and friends in particular. Statically among these subjects, the topic of friends and friendship occupies a considerable portion of these percepts (Alon, Socrates in Medieval Arabic Literature, 153) and it seems that after comes the interrelation of men and women.     
            In the set of precepts related to “friendship” (in distinction of “love”), there are a few aphoristic lines on the value and high status, excellence, uniqueness and importance of friendship / ‘muhabbah’ in comparison with the other things (Comparable with Themistius, On Friendship; Xenophon, Memorabilia I.VI.14) and at the same time friendship is defined as “internal mutual affection of the hearts with mutual harmony of the spirits” ( Shahrazuri, Nuzhah 70v1).  Accordingly, it should be possible to find friendship in every human being although it does not negate the necessary education for it by those who has the responsibility of others. Moreover, it is a reciprocal affection, therefore, abstention on our part towards a person who wants us is low-mindedness, whereas, our desiring a person who abstain from us is self-degradation (Munqidh, Lubab al-Adab, 464, 14; Hunain b. Ishaq, Min Nawadir al-Falasifah 80,5). Therefore, when everyone knows their own value beyond any kind of self-despise or self- arrogance, mutual affection may take shape. But according to the mentioned definition, it is not enough for reciprocal affection to be combined with the mutual harmony of the spirits / ‘arwah’. In this regard, we observe that in the gnomic medieval Arabic literature, there are many positive / negative precepts; or in other words, factors that enhance/ undermine the necessary harmony of spirits are applicable both for micro (such as mate friendship or family) and macro (such as group and community) levels. In relation with our research for macro societal level, we can mention to these pair themes: betrayal / devotion; flexibility / toughness; forgiveness / revenge; hostility / friendliness; self-respect / self-degrading; self- involvement / other-interference; praise / abuse; trust / suspension and the like. 
        More or less through examining aphoristic medieval Arabic literature about friendship, there is provided and constructed a general textual perspective about “communal” friendship that can be used as a suitable background for entering into the “societal” one. Here the differentiation and distinction of “community” from “society” is very crucial for the quality and content of the examined Arabic literature on friendship is apparently and predominantly communal, although it is not devoid of societal dimension too. It means that beyond or along the intimate friendship in the community, there is another kind of friendship that exists in society with all of its related characteristics, such as inequality, hierarchies/orders, differentiations, and obscurity. According to these texts, there are different hierarchies that can be classified under these topics: good / bad characters; knowable / unknowable peoples; righteous / unrighteous; grateful / ungrateful; and the like. Therefore, in making friendships in this societal milieu, we have to pay serious attention to these characteristics and in other words societal friendship will have a special meaning and form. According to the medieval Arabic gnomic literature, it may mean that societal friendship takes shape very slowly and late: “there was inscribed on the door of Socrates’ cell: “peace on him who does not know me nor I him” (Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 129,18); and even when it starts, it begins with pessimism and through many tests and checks, Socrates was asked:” Tell us about healthy life” and he replied:” It consists of the least involved [possible] (lit. knowledge of) people. Asked to elaborate on this, he said: “It means ignoring those of them that you know.” (Alon, Socrates Arabus Life and Teachings, 1995, 67). And in regard to the tests related to friendship, there are many rather long aphorisms (see, Hunain b. Ishaq, Min nawadir Suqrat 63v3) about the different examinations that should be done, and then societal friendship succeeds or fails. 
      This slow and compound procedure makes the nature of societal friendship a kind of prudent and “moderate proximity” and at the same time very “limited” in scope and range. With regard to the different hierarchies that exits in society, we should avoid of excess and deficiency that both are anti societal that is, in the society people should avoid of too distance and too closeness, and instead on the basis of virtue and goodness or happiness leading a middle conduct (Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 119,24). But we cannot expect in these aphoristic precepts finding the explicit meaning of or description about virtue or goodness in relation to friendship, therefore, we have to appeal to guess. According to the context of virtue or goodness applications, we see that it is used predominantly in relation to “action’, therefore, virtue as the standard of middle conduct and behavior in societal friendship may mean preventing of evil and persuading to good deeds. Thus, virtue refers to the appropriate action that should be done or avoided by us, or our friend and all this can be inferred from the aphorisms. 

      2 – Law 
   With regard to the above virtual construction of societal friendship out of the medieval Arabic gnomic literature, it is made possible to explore two of its related components that can be found in the concerned precepts. Apart from the existence of “law” in the biographical form of precepts related to “imaginative Socrates”, there are some “analogies” that can give us a general outline about this word. Before discussing these analogies, two points are noteworthy. Primarily, in the medieval Arabic gnomic literature the idea or notion of law is expressed by many words, not merely and only one, which I will give the Arabic equivalent, where it is necessary. Besides, all the Arabic words related to “law” refer to the written law and not unwritten one.            
              There are about three crucial interesting analogies between law with crown; physician; and philosophy that each pair has its own specific explicit and implicit meanings and connotations. The analogy of crown with right law may refer to the ordered and definite spread of laws and king’s crown, their value and our responsibility in preserving them too. Here the Arabic word for right law is “beautiful sunnah / tradition” that the second word basically in mediaeval Arabic means method and way. Moreover, the word law is used with the qualification “beautiful” that means good with both ethical aesthetic connotations. Accordingly, in this analogy both the king’s crown and good written laws are compared in their broadness and stretchiness, and thus in this condition they should not be rejected but preserved (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam, 85, 17). There is also the analogy of law (in the same meaning of way and method in Arabic) with philosophy that is very important and gives us some notional hints. Here these three organic interconnected contrasted precepts about philosophy and law form their related analogy: teaching vs. forcing; will vs. necessity; and doing justice vs. preventing crimes. Accordingly, philosophy has some connections with teaching, free will and doing justice, whereas law has its own connections with force, necessity and preventing from committing crimes, and as a result philosophy is better than law as the second best (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam, 97, 7). Only here on the basis of this analogy, we may have a general outline of the written law without any religious connotation that as a suitable medium out of necessity forces people to avoid crimes.               
             Up to now in these two analogies, law has a nonreligious meaning but in the analogy of law with body- physician appears a religious one. The basis of this analogy is the essential and basic analogy of body/soul. On this basis law has its root in religion and the faith-physician (in comparison with body-physician) is responsible to take care of it with the aim of improving the soul of the sinners (the divine origin of law is comparable with Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV,IV,19; Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam,91,11; and Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 116,22). Here law is the equivalent of religious law or “shariah” / nomos and has nonhuman origin with a pathological aim that is curing the soul of sinners by particular professionals who are faith physicians. Although the meaning of ‘shariah’ is not limited to this kind of law and primarily has much broader meaning - as an example of this point, we can refer to : Abu Hayyan al-Tauhidi, Al-Basair wal-dhakhair, I-II 451, 14 that used the same word ‘shariah’ in relation to Socrates as a law-giver. If with regard to these precepts, the scope of religious law is limited and if it is not universal, what about the nonreligious law that we have mentioned in the two past analogies? Interestingly, there is one contestable enigmatic aphorism in the medieval Arabic gnomic literature that can be used as an answer to the first question and according to it a good nature adheres to the law in the meaning of religious one (Anonymous, Al-Mukhtar min kalam al-hukama al-araba’ah al-akabir, 112,10). Accordingly, the good natures do not oppose with the ‘shariah’ / nomos (this is the word used in this precept and not law in the meaning of “tradition”) and a kind of integrity takes shape. And in regard to the second question, there is an aphorism according to which the law made by the supreme authority, king who has public utility, should be obeyed (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam, 99, 9). Therefore, human being (in another precept the moderate person can as well prescribe laws and regulations that are acceptable to multitude. See Hunain b. Ishaq, Min nawadir Suqrat 36r6) can make law in the meaning of tradition / ‘sunnah’ as the second best (in comparison with philosophy) for all with observing the standard of public interest and people should not break, deny or oppose it but just obey.         
            

            3- Kingship 
    Kingship (in Arabic ‘malek’ and in ambiguous differentiation from leader, ruler and governor) and any kind of mastership has a wide range of uses both for god, human and the other things. And we can see that this same notion is used in medieval Arabic gnomic literature both for political and non-political fields. In non-political field, this word or its equivalents is used only and merely for the human faculties or potentialities and in a way of advice about the proper and suitable ordering and arrangement that should be among them. For example, there are aphorisms about the necessity of mastering desires by human beings or the role and function of sensible and intelligible kings in relation to prevent people from anger (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam,124,9 / 107, 14; and Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 128, 20 / 143,13. It is comparable with Isocrates, To Nicoles, 29, and To Demonicus 21). Thereby, human beings should have a mastership /possession over their unsuitable desires in order to prevent from bad results. 
          Beside this non-political application, there are diverse political uses of the word kingship and we should not expect a monolithic image of it. In a few aphorisms, there are unsatisfactory and somehow impolite judgments about kingship and in other words we read an image about political mastership and even serving king from negative perspective and angle which brings servitude and in its own turn grief, sadness and toil: “if you wish to become a king, be a wild ass”(Abu al-fath Shahrastani, Al-milal wal-nihal 282,2; Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 141,20). A rather less negative notion appears when kingship is compared with friendship and in this context it become unimportant or has not priority when there is no friendship.      
         But there are positive and optimistic medieval Arabic precepts about kingship and here these two axes attract our attention: qualities of kings and mutual duties between kings and people and among them the specific commands and admonitions of kings by Socrates himself. In regard to king’s characteristics, we read the existence of intellect and religion/ ‘din’ with more emphasis on the former in him; avoidance and discontent of this world’s pleasures and comfort; and being good, wise and just (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam,103,1; and Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah,121, 1; 124, 12). Among these qualities, Arabic precepts have notable nuances about justice and wisdom that is a parallelism between individual soul and society or city at large and besides, justice is considered as an intellectual faculty: “ the source of a man’s happiness/’farah’ is a heart of moderate temperament, and the source of public (lit. world’s/ ’alam’) happiness is a just/ ‘adel’ king”, then the related aphorism mention to the opposites of these two in man as an individual and the public (al-amili,K al-Mikhlah, 10). Therefore, the justness and unjustness of king is very important for the happiness and grief of the public. In continuation of this notion, justice is considered “as one of the intellect noblest faculties” (Usamah Ibn Munqidh, Lubab al-adab 432, 12) and thereby justice has interconnections with intellect.       
        After the qualities of king, there are aphorism about the mutual duties of the king and people and among them particularly there are some interesting commands and admonitions by Socrates/’suqrat’ (as a proper name) to the kings. Among the duties of king in relation to the public in the medieval Arabic gnomic literature there are: consulting with scholars and cultivating men of letters; removing evil people away from himself and his kingdom; provision of laws for public interest; friendship with righteous, trustworthy, and faithful people; being beneficial to the people through educating and preventing them from inflicting harm on each other (see for example, Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam,97,13; 99,10); and among the duties of people there are: not surpassing the king in truthfulness at the position of subjects and servants; not opposing the king who makes laws for public interest (see for example, Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam, 104,18; and Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 126, 11). Accordingly and comparatively, the king’s duties are more qualitative and quantitative, and at the same time people’s duties do not turn around competition and opposition with the king. And here among the duties of people there are few particular precepts about the different commands and admonitions and enlightening of Socrates directly to the kings, apart from those who are related closely to them, about different matters. In one of these rather long aphorisms about time and luck, we read reply of imaginative Socrates to an anonymous king in these words:” Time has done justice to no one…. You will see that people only belong to one of two groups: those who are ambitious, whose luck impedes them, and those who are behind, whose luck promote them. Be content,..., or else you shall have to accept it willy-nilly”(Hunain b. Ishaq, Ma dhakarahu Ibn Ishaq, 17r17 – although there are other variants of this notion too). Besides, there is: “God/ ‘Allah’ who has created this world of trail and the world-to-come one of reward. …. What He takes he does in return for what He gives, and when He tries someone, he [only] does so in order to reward him” (Al-Mubashshir Ibn Fatik, Mukhtar al-hikam, 100,18; and Shams al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwah, 122, 15). In these two aphorisms Socrates addresses two nameless kings that somehow are inflicted by undesirable issues such as misfortune and death of child in the first and second cases respectively and then Socrates advices and admonitions them about the fate, fortune and this and that worlds.        
               
           As a conclusion, by reading medieval Arabic gnomic (ideological) literature related to Socrates [political] teachings, we see that they are receptions from different knowable and unknowable Greek and non-Greek available sources at that time. At the same time it should be noted that the concerned aphorisms are not categorized or classified topically and it is the task of researcher that according to his /her research takes the necessary measures about them. Accordingly we cannot expect that there be minute and exact correspondences between the medieval Arabic reception and the authentic sources related to Socrates but it is possible to distinguish some “analogical correspondences” among the medieval Arabic literature about Socrates’ political teachings and the specific available and extant authentic pertinent texts we have now. 
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